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ABSTRACT
Small adversarial perturbations of input data are able to
drastically change performance of machine learning sys-
tems, thereby challenging the validity of such systems. We
present the very first end-to-end adversarial attacks on a
music instrument classification system allowing to add per-
turbations directly to audio waveforms instead of spectro-
grams. Our attacks are able to reduce the accuracy close to
a random baseline while at the same time keeping pertur-
bations almost imperceptible and producing misclassifica-
tions to any desired instrument.
1. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial attacks add marginal and often imperceptible
perturbations to input data, thereby drastically changing
the performance of state of the art machine learning sys-
tems. This phenomenon has been first discovered in im-
age object recognition [1], where high performing systems
based on deep learning are highly sensible to impercepti-
ble perturbations of images created by an adversary trying
to fool the system.
While adversarial attacks typically do not pose a se-
curity threat in the field of Music Information Retrieval
(MIR), they allow to question and analyse the validity of
MIR systems, as is being done for a music instrument clas-
sification system in this paper. For this purpose we evalu-
ate four different adversarial attack approaches on music
instrument classification. Starting from an audio wave-
form, the attacks produce perturbed versions, i.e. adver-
sarial examples, that are misclassified as any instrument
we choose, while having a very high signal to noise ratio
(SNR) between original signal and added perturbation of
up to 44.23dB on average. Contrary to previous results [2]
only using spectral representations of audio as image in-
puts to algorithms from image recognition [1], we also
adapt adversarial attacks from speech recognition [3]. This
enables us to perform attacks in an end-to-end fashion, in-
stead of on the spectrogram. Another novel aspect of our
work is that our data are monophonic instrument or singing
voice sounds, not polyphonic songs from different genres,
which makes adversarial perturbations easier to hear and
hence harder to hide in the original waveform.
In what follows, we start with reviewing related work
in section 2, before we introduce our data (section 3) and
instrument classification system as well as four end-to-end
adversarial attacks in section 4. Thereafter, we compare
the different approaches in our experiments (section 5),
and discuss and summarize results in sections 6 and 7.
2. RELATED WORK
Since the vulnerability of neural networks to adversar-
ial examples was discovered [1], numerous different ap-
proaches of adversarial attacks have been proposed. These
attacks are often differentiated by how much knowledge
they use, i.e. white box or black box attacks, and whether
they aim to change the classification of an example to an ar-
bitrary (untargeted attack) or specified new class (targeted
attack). White box attacks are denoted as such whenever
we assume (near) perfect knowledge about a system, and
e.g. have access to a model and its parameters. For black
box attacks we have very limited knowledge of a system
and no access to elements such as model parameters.
A prominent early example of white box untargeted
adversarial attacks is the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [4]. Instead of trying to decrease the loss of an
image with respect to its ground-truth class as is done dur-
ing training of a classifier, FGSM increases the loss by
pushing the image one step into the gradient direction of
said loss function. A second untargeted white box method
is Projected Gradient Descent applied to the negative loss
function (PGDn) [5], where the loss of an input example is
maximised iteratively.
Further examples of adversarial attacks from the image
domain, including both white and black box attacks, as
well as untargeted and targeted methods, are Deepfool [6],
the universal adversarial attack [7], the L0, L2 and L∞ at-
tack [8] and the one-pixel attack [9].
In the field of speech recognition, a white box targeted
attack has been proposed by Carlini & Wagner [3], in
which the computation of adversarial examples for an end-
to-end speech-to-text system is formulated as an optimi-
sation problem. This approach is particularly interesting
due to its usage of audio and we will refer to it as C&W
in the remainder of our paper. Other approaches in the au-
dio domain use psychoacoustic hiding to make adversarial
perturbations as imperceptible as possible [10, 11].
In work related to ours in this paper, an adversarial at-
tack from the image domain (cf. [8]) is applied to various
sound event classifiers with a particular focus on the trans-
ferability of adversarial examples between networks [12].
While Figure 1 in section 2 in [12] suggests that the attack
is performed end-to-end, this is not clarified any further
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in the remainder of the work; further work suggests, that
there is still a lack of reliable attacks for raw waveform
signals [13]. Different research directions in audio are the
robustness of adversarial attacks in sound event classifi-
cation [14], and increasing the robustness of audio classi-
fiers against adversaries, e.g. by detecting adversarial ex-
amples [13, 15, 16].
For the field of MIR, so-called irrelevant random but
linear time-invariant audio filtering transformations of the
music signal have been used in an untargeted black box
attack to both drastically deflate and inflate the perfor-
mance [17] of genre classification systems. The irrel-
evance is ascertained with listening tests and real hu-
man subjects, with the transformation being audible but
not changing the clear impression of a certain musical
genre. The same problematic behaviour has also been
documented concerning music emotion classification [17]
(again using filtering transformations) and rhythm classifi-
cation [18], where a slight untargeted change in tempo is
able to fool the classifier.
Going beyond untargeted filtering approaches, first tar-
geted white box attacks on genre recognition systems have
been reported [2], building upon approaches from im-
age object recognition [1]. Essentially magnitude spectral
frames computed from audio are treated as images, which
however requires non-trivial care to ensure that produced
adversarial examples are also valid audio signals.
As for the MIR system we are trying to attack in this pa-
per, instrument classification can be divided [19] into the
following tasks, with increasing degree of difficulty: iso-
lated note instrument classification, solo instrument classi-
fication, and multi-label classification in polyphonic mix-
tures. The data used in this paper is a subset derived from a
recent audio tagging challenge (see section 3), essentially
yielding isolated note and solo instrument data as well as
singing voice audio. Our data is therefore an expanded ver-
sion of isolated note classification, which has largely been
solved (see e.g. [20]) and therefore is a good testbed for our
adversarial attacks by providing unambiguous class infor-
mation, clear spectral characteristics per instrument and a
difficult setting for hiding adversarial information.
3. DATA
The data used in this work is a subset of the curated training
set provided for Task 2 in the DCASE2019 Challenge [21].
More precisely, out of originally 4970 samples with di-
verse audio labels, we use all 799 mono audio files which
are annotated with one single out of 12 different musical
labels: accordion, acoustic guitar, bass drum, bass guitar,
electric guitar, female singing, glockenspiel, gong, har-
monica, hi-hat, male singing, and marimba / xylophone.
The labels are similarly distributed, and occur at least 47
and at most 75 times among the 799 files. In what follows,
we use the term instrument to describe both instrumental
and singing voice sounds.
All audio files and their manually obtained labels orig-
inate from the Freesound Dataset [22]. The labels them-
selves are weak, i.e. only available at clip-level without
starting and ending time information. Audio samples es-
sentially consist of isolated notes or single instrument
sounds as well as singing voice audio, with very few of the
curated train samples having potentially incomplete labels.
In other words, labelled instruments are always present in
the audio, but there might be additional instrument sounds
which are not represented in the respective annotation.
To reduce computational expenses without significant
loss of quality, we re-sample all audio files from 44.1 kHz
to 16 kHz. The length of different audio samples varies
from 0.3 to 29.29 seconds.
4. METHODS
4.1 Instrument classification system
Data Pre-Processing: In contrast to previous work on ad-
versaries in MIR, cf. [2], in which adversarial examples
are computed for spectrograms, we perform adversarial at-
tacks end-to-end, i.e. on raw waveforms. This avoids hav-
ing to restrict spectrograms in non-trivial ways to remain
valid time-domain signals. To achieve this, we use a dif-
ferentiable pre-processing module in front of the convolu-
tional neural network (CNN) used for classification. By us-
ing torchaudio 1 to realise this first module, we can trans-
form audio into a desired time-frequency representation,
and still propagate gradients back to the original wave-
forms.
To transform raw audio into the time-frequency do-
main, we first compute spectrograms with a Fast Fourier-
Transform (FFT) size of 2048, an equally sized Hann-
window and a hop size of 512. The spectrograms are
subsequently mapped to Mel-scale, with 100 Mel-bands
between 40 Hz and 8 kHz. Then, the resulting Mel-
spectrograms are transformed to decibel (dB) scale and
normalised to have zero mean and a standard deviation of
one over the different Mel-bands, across all training data.
Whenever we need to lengthen a spectrogram because of
network requirements, we perform padding by repeating
the spectrogram and inserting the repetitions with equal
lengths both before and after the original time-frequency
representation.
The Architecture: In order to perform instrument clas-
sification, we use a CNN with its architecture depicted in
Figure 1. The network consists of multiple convolutional
layers with 5 × 5 and 3 × 3 convolutions and ReLU acti-
vations, followed by batch normalisation [23] and average-
pooling layers. Padding values correspond to the strides of
convolutional layers. For regularisation, dropout is used.
The final layers additionally contain 1 × 1 convolutions
and a global pooling layer, which performs global average-
pooling over the frequency-, and global max-pooling over
the time-dimension of an input.
Training and Evaluation Routine: We split the data into
a training and validation set containing 599 and 200 audio
files respectively. Due to the small size of the dataset, we
perform the evaluation of subsequent experiments on val-
idation data. To train the network, we use cross-entropy
1 https://pytorch.org/audio
Input 1 × 100 × 116
5 × 5 Conv(stride = 2, activations = relu, out channels = 64), BN()
3 × 3 Conv(stride = 1, activations = relu, out channels = 64), BN()
2 × 2 AveragePooling(stride = (2, 2))
Dropout(0.3)
3 × 3 Conv(stride = 1, activations = relu, out channels = 128), BN()
3 × 3 Conv(stride = 1, activations = relu, out channels = 128), BN()
2 × 3 AveragePooling(stride = (2, 3))
Dropout(0.3)
3 × 3 Conv(stride = 1, activations = relu, out channels = 256), BN()
3 × 3 Conv(stride = 1, activations = relu, out channels = 256), BN()
2 × 3 AveragePooling(stride = (2, 3))
Dropout(0.3)
1 × 1 Conv(stride = 1, activations = relu, out channels = 512), BN()
Dropout(0.5)
1 × 1 Conv(stride = 1, activations = relu, out channels = 12)
GlobalPooling()
Softmax()
Figure 1: Architecture of CNN used for instrument classi-
fication. BN corresponds to Batch-normalisation layers;
GlobalPooling describes a global average-pooling over
the frequency-, and a global max-pooling over the time-
dimension. Input: channels×Mel bands× windows.
loss and the Adam optimiser with an initial learning rate of
0.001 for 150 epochs and a batch-size of 16. In addition,
we use learning rate decay after 90 epochs with a multi-
plicative factor of 0.1. For normalisation of both training
and validation data we use the global mean and standard
deviation of all 100 different Mel-bands over the training
data.
To allow batch-wise training, we use windowed spec-
trograms of length 116. For shorter spectrograms, we per-
form padding as described above; for longer spectrograms,
on the other hand, we extract half-overlapping windows
of length 116 and choose an arbitrary one for each iter-
ation. When performing validation, we use spectrograms
with their original lengths, or padded versions to fulfil min-
imum length requirements of the network.
4.2 Adversarial Attacks
In our experiments, we apply four different adversarial
white box attacks to an instrument classification system.
Two of these attacks, namely FGSM and PGDn (cf. section
2), are untargeted. The other two are targeted attacks, and
both adaptations of the C&W method (cf. section 2). The
first version is a slightly modified C&W method, adapted
to be suitable for our system. In the second targeted at-
tack, we incorporate a new loss function modelling audio
domain knowledge.
To clarify the differences of these approaches, we can
look at their optimisation goals which define how an adver-
sarial perturbation is computed. In what follows, ∇ cor-
responds to a gradient and Lnet to the cross-entropy loss
function, which we also use to train our model. Note that
f describes our instrument classification system, including
both the pre-processing module as well as the classifier,
and x and y denote the original signal and its ground-truth
label. The adversarial perturbation that we want to com-
pute is δ, i.e. an adversarial example can be expressed by
x + δ. The perturbation δ is always initialised with zeros
unless stated otherwise. For iterative methods, η describes
the multiplication factor for gradient updates, and k cor-
responds to the current iteration. Target predictions for
targeted attacks are denoted by t. Furthermore, we use a
factor α for the targeted methods to control the trade-off
between finding adversarial perturbations more easily, and
keeping perturbations as small as possible. All gradient
updates are performed based on the sign of the gradient.
FGSM: The Fast Gradient Sign method [4] is the only sin-
gle step approach, for which we compute the adversarial
perturbation δ by moving a scaled step in the gradient di-
rection in order to increase the loss, i.e.
δ = λ ∗ sign(∇x Lnet(f(x), y)). (1)
The parameter λ is a scaling factor controlling the trade-off
between difficulty of finding adversarial examples and the
quality thereof.
PGDn: Projected Gradient Descent on the negative loss
function [5] is an untargeted attack with the purpose of in-
creasing the loss of a sample iteratively. For this attack, we
start at a random point close to the original signal, i.e. we
initialise the adversarial perturbation by sampling from a
uniform distribution U(−, ). After initialisation, we up-
date the perturbation by computing
δk+1 = clip(δk+η∗sign(∇δk Lnet(f(x+δk), y))). (2)
In each iteration, δ is clipped to stay between − and .
C&W: In contrast to the untargeted attacks, in which gra-
dient ascent is used to increase the loss on a ground-truth
label to change the prediction of a classifier, we use gradi-
ent descent for the targeted methods to minimise the loss
with respect to a particular target class t. Instead of min-
imising the network loss directly, the C&W method opti-
mises a weighted combination of squared L2-norm of the
perturbation and a so-called CTC-loss function [3]. As the
CTC-loss function is specific to speech-to-text systems, we
substitute it with the cross-entropy loss function. Again,
C&W clips the perturbation δ in each iteration, leading to
Ltotal = ‖δk‖22 + α ∗ Lnet(f(x+ δk), t),
δk+1 = clip(δk − η ∗ sign(∇δkLtotal)). (3)
The original C&W method uses a re-scaling factor to scale
clipped adversarial perturbations in order to stay below
certain SNR-thresholds [3]. This factor is decreased as
soon as an initial adversarial example is discovered; we
omit the re-scaling factor in Eqn (3), as we stop attacks
immediately after an initial perturbation is found.
Multi-Scale C&W: The fourth adversarial attack is a dif-
ferent adaptation of C&W [3]. As opposed to using the
squared norm to keep perturbations small, we use a multi-
scale loss [24] in order to make original and adversarial
waveform sound as similar as possible. More precisely,
we use
Lspec =
∑
i
‖Xi − Xˆi‖1 + ‖ logXi − log Xˆi‖1,
Ltotal = Lspec + α ∗ Lnet(f(x+ δk), t),
δk+1 = clip(δk − η ∗ sign(∇δkLtotal)). (4)
Note that xˆ is short for an adversarial example, i.e. x+ δk,
and upper-case letters describe a signal transformed to the
time-frequency domain. The index i is used to iterate
over spectra resulting from different Fourier transforma-
tion sizes (2048, 1024, 512, 256, 128, 64; cf. [24]).
5. EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Experimental Setup
In what follows, we compare the four end-to-end adver-
sarial attacks introduced in section 4.2. For three of the
four methods we use Adam [25] to perform gradient de-
scent and ascent respectively. As FGSM requires only a
single gradient update, we apply stochastic gradient ascent
instead of using Adam. We also apply a grid-search to
find attack-specific parameters, and restrict each iterative
method to find an adversarial perturbation within 500 iter-
ations. To further reduce complexity, we sample random
target classes different from a sample’s original prediction
once for targeted attacks, and use these targets in all pa-
rameter settings within the grid-search. More information
on used parameters for the different methods can be found
in section A.1 in the supplementary material. To allow re-
producibility of results, all code to run the experiments is
available via github 2 .
5.2 Results
In Table 1, we compare the four adversarial attacks intro-
duced in section 4.2 based on multiple factors. First, we
state the number of adversarial examples found for our 200
validation samples, followed by the average accuracy on
the validation set with respect to the ground-truth labels.
This accuracy is computed on the adversarial signal of a
sample if one was found, or else on the original signal.
The last three columns are computed solely on adversar-
ial examples, and depict the average SNR, the median of
iterations it takes an adversary to find an adversarial per-
turbation, and finally the average confidence of our system
when classifying an adversarial example. The confidence
of a sample here refers to the probability that our system
assigns to its predicted class. As the initial perturbation for
PGDn and the targets for C&W and Multi-Scale C&W are
sampled randomly, we repeat these experiments five times
and state mean and standard deviation over all runs. Lines
3 to 6 in Table 1 are based on the parameter settings in our
grid-search that achieve the highest average SNR with at
least 150 found adversarial examples. In lines 7 to 10, we
show how these results change when requiring at least 180
found adversarial examples. Whenever we refer to differ-
ences being statistically significant in the remainder of this
section, it means significant as tested via paired t-tests at
a 5% error level; for more detailed results, including exact
t-test results, we refer to section A.1 in the supplementary
material.
Number of Samples: The results for each of the four ad-
versarial attacks are chosen in a way, that either at least 150
2 https://github.com/msBluemchen/adversarial_instrument_classification
or 180 adversarial examples are found. The overall lowest
number is achieved by PGDn, with an average of 151.8.
Both when requiring at least 150 or 180 samples, Multi-
Scale C&W is the method that finds the highest amount
of adversarial examples, with on average 163.6 and 196.4
samples. The difference to the remaining methods is statis-
tically significant. Note, that for all of the four methods ex-
cept of FGSM it is possible to find at least 180 adversarial
examples; for the single-step method, the highest amount
of samples that is found within our grid-search is 179.
Accuracy: The average accuracy on validation data is
strongly influenced by the number of adversarial examples
an adversary finds. The more often an adversary is suc-
cessful in finding adversarial perturbations, the lower the
accuracy tends to go; exceptions are adversarial examples
that lead to correct predictions for previously misclassified
samples. After an adversarial attack, the reduced accuracy
of our system is always close to the baseline accuracy of
0.125, which can be achieved by predicting only the most
frequent class within the validation set (’Gong’). More
precisely, the average accuracy is between 0.250 and 0.167
when we require 150 adversarial examples found by an ad-
versary, and by requiring at least 180 examples, this even
drops to values between 0.130 and 0.024. In both scenar-
ios, FGSM achieves the highest accuracy with 0.250 and
0.130, followed by the targeted C&W method with aver-
ages of 0.201 and 0.094. PGDn leads to the second lowest
accuracies with 0.171 and 0.026. Multi-Scale C&W results
in the lowest average accuracy of 0.167 and 0.024, which
is statistically significant compared to FGSM and C&W.
To put these results into perspective, we take a look at
how the accuracy of our system changes if we add random
white noise instead of adversarial perturbations to valida-
tion samples. When we overlay original signals with white
noise of a similar average SNR as the two targeted attacks
(42.16dB), the accuracy of our system remains with 0.79
close to the accuracy of 0.835 on clean data.
In Figure 2, three confusion matrices illustrate the ac-
curacy of our system after different attacks. The columns
are ground-truth labels, and the rows represent predictions;
correct predictions are in the diagonal, and confusions off-
diagonal. Each column is normalised to sum to 1, such
that a column shows the percentage of correct and incor-
rect classifications for one ground-truth class. For detailed
confusion matrices including numerical values, we refer to
section A.2 in the supplementary material. The leftmost
image shows the performance on clean data. The majority
of predictions is concentrated in the diagonal of the ma-
trix; the classes which are least often classified correctly
by our system are ’Marimba and xylophone’ and ’Elec-
tric guitar’. The remaining two matrices are chosen to de-
pict an untargeted as well as a targeted attack leading to a
broad variety of new classifications. The confusion matrix
in the middle shows the confusions of our system after a
PGDn attack. The untargeted attack leads to diverse new
predictions, and appears to have the most difficulties with
finding adversarial examples for samples with the ground-
truth class ’Male singing’, which results in the only no-
Data Origin # Samples Accuracy SNR Iterations Confidence
clean 200 0.835 - - 0.93
FGSM 153 0.250 −7.74 1.0 0.72
PGDn 151.8± 0.7* 0.171± 0.004* 40.13± 0.05* 15.8± 0.4* 0.55± 0.00*
C&W 153.2± 2.6* 0.201± 0.016* 44.23± 0.37* 51.4± 2.7* 0.45± 0.00*
C&Wmulti_scale 163.6± 3.0* 0.167± 0.012 * 43.82± 0.09* 71.6± 5.4* 0.44± 0.00*
FGSM 179 0.130 -24.83 1.0 0.86
PGDn 190.8± 1.2* 0.026± 0.004* 16.47± 0.10* 2.0± 0.0* 0.74± 0.01*
C&W 180.2± 2.3* 0.094± 0.010* 42.98± 0.18* 66.1± 3.7* 0.44± 0.01*
C&Wmulti_scale 196.4± 1.0* 0.024± 0.004* 39.49± 0.17* 22.6± 1.0* 0.49± 0.01*
Table 1: Comparison of four end-to-end adversarial attacks on our instrument classification system. Results are chosen
based on largest SNR with at least 150 (lines 3 to 6) and 180 (lines 7 to 10) out of 200 adversarial examples respectively.
Depicted are averages or the median over samples; for PGDn, C&W and Multi-Scale C&W additionally average and
standard deviation* of results over 5 runs are stated.
ticeable diagonal entry in Figure 2. When allowing big-
ger perturbations for the untargeted methods FGSM and
PGDn (see sections A.2.2 and A.2.3 in the supplementary
material), the confusions change significantly, as more and
more samples with various ground-truth classes are clas-
sified as one of ’Gong’, ’Harmonica’ or ’Hi-hat’. Finally,
the rightmost confusion matrix in Figure 2 depicts confu-
sions after a targeted Multi-Scale C&W attack. The new
predictions are very diverse, and values in the diagonal of
the matrix are close or equal to 0.
SNR: The signal to noise ratio (SNR) is computed as the
ratio between original signal and added perturbation, with
higher values signifying higher quality of audio, or less
perceptible perturbations. Allowing bigger perturbations
simplifies the task of finding higher numbers of adversar-
ial examples, but it tends to decrease the average SNR.
To clarify the level of perceptibility of different adversar-
ial examples, we refer to the hearing examples in section
A.3 in our supplementary material 3 . Attacks with high
SNR around 40dB can hardly be perceived at all or as
low-volume high-frequency noise. All four attacks achieve
higher average SNRs when we require at least 150 as op-
posed to 180 adversarial examples to be found. FGSM
leads to the lowest SNRs with averages of -7.74dB and
-24.83dB; while in the first case, this leads to clearly per-
ceptible perturbations with still recognisable classes, the
second case leads to distorted and therefore not meaningful
adversarial examples. In order to find adversarial pertur-
bations with FGSM that are less perceptible, significantly
smaller scaling values  are required, leading to small num-
bers of found adversarial examples. The average SNRs
for PGDn, C&W and Multi-Scale C&W when requiring
at least 150 adversarial examples are very similar, and for
all three methods around 40dB. The highest average of
44.23dB is achieved with the C&W method.
When increasing the amount of required adversarial ex-
amples to be at least 180, the average SNRs for both C&W
and Multi-Scale C&W decrease slightly to 42.98dB and
39.49dB respectively; the average SNR of PGDn, however,
3 https://msbluemchen.github.io/adversarial_instrument_classification
drops significantly to 16.47dB. This leads to perceptible
adversarial perturbations of PGDn, while the original class
remains recognisable. The difference of the SNR of C&W
compared to the remaining three methods is statistically
significant.
Iterations: As the number of iterations it takes for an
adversary to find a perturbation for a particular sample
strongly varies, iterations are stated as the median or the
average± the standard deviation over medians of different
runs. By definition, the single-step FGSM is the adversary
requiring the least amount of iterations. The second least
iterations are needed by PGDn, taking averages of 15.8 and
2.0 iterations. For the two targeted methods, the number of
needed iterations appears to depend on specific parameter
settings; in the first case, C&W requires 51.4 iterations as
opposed to 71.6 for Multi-Scale C&W. In the second sce-
nario however, Multi-Scale C&W takes less iterations on
average with 22.6 iterations in contrast to 66.1 by C&W.
In addition to looking at the number of iterations
that different attacks take in various parameter settings,
we compare runtime complexities of single iterations
with respect to the waveform length N . The gradient
∇δLnet(f(x+δ), y) is computed in each of the four meth-
ods, which is why we consider it to be a given and focus on
the complexity of the remaining computations. For FGSM,
PGDn and C&W these computations are bounded by N ,
which is why the attacks are all O(N). Multi-Scale C&W
on the other hand is dominated by the Fourier transforma-
tions in the computation of Lspec in Eqn (4), and is hence
O(N logN).
Confidence: The confidence of our system when classify-
ing adversarial examples tends to decrease with increasing
SNRs. More precisely, FGSM achieves the highest confi-
dences with averages of 0.72 and 0.86. Nevertheless, the
average confidence of the system does not fall below 0.44.
5.3 Using Targeted Attacks to Predict Accordion
Instead of randomly choosing a target class when using the
two targeted end-to-end attacks, we can also try to trans-
form any class into a particular target class. To demon-
(a) Clean data (b) PGDn data
( = 0.0005 and η = 1e− 05)
(c) Multi-Scale C&W data
(α = 15,  = 0.01, η = 5e− 05)
Figure 2: Confusion matrices computed on validation data, showing correct predictions in the diagonal, confusions off-
diagonal. For samples without adversarial counterpart, original audio is used. Columns are ground-truth labels and rows
predictions; in addition, columns are normalised to sum to 1. Order of labels (left to right and top to bottom): Accordion,
Acoustic guitar, Bass drum, Bass guitar, Electric guitar, Female singing, Glockenspiel, Gong, Harmonica, Hi-hat, Male
singing, Marimba and xylophone.
strate this, we use the ’Accordion’ class, as it is one of
the hardest target classes to reach in prior experiments.
For C&W, we find adversarial perturbations for all but 4
samples with the ground-truth classes ’Gong’ and ’Male
singing’. The adversarial examples have an average SNR
of 37.41dB±10.72 and are predicted with an average con-
fidence of 0.44 ± 0.12. As a median, the adversary takes
29 iterations to find a successful adversarial perturbation.
For Multi-Scale C&W, the adversary is successful
in finding adversarial examples for all but 7 samples.
The adversarial perturbations lead to an average SNR of
37.57dB±10.82, and are classified with an average confi-
dence of 0.44± 0.11. The median of required iterations is
33. For more information on the parameters we use for the
two methods, we refer to section A.2.6 in the supplemen-
tary material.
6. DISCUSSION
In summary, we see that all four adversarial attacks are
able to significantly reduce the accuracy of our instrument
classification system. The first untargeted attack, FGSM,
is the least complex of the algorithms due to its single-step
nature, but also leads to the largest perturbations. PGDn
is slightly more complex, and leads to very similar predic-
tions for all adversarial examples whenever high pertur-
bations are allowed. The quality of audio is improved in
comparison to the results of FGSM, as we can reach SNRs
comparable to the targeted attacks.
The best attack based on the average SNR within our
experiments is the targeted C&W method. Despite its
comparably high median of required iterations, it still has
an asymptotically lower runtime complexity than the tar-
geted Multi-Scale C&W, and reaches average SNRs of
above 40dB. The increase of the runtime complexity due to
the computation of Fourier transforms within Multi-Scale
C&W does not always pay off in comparison to C&W,
particularly in cases where we want to find large num-
bers of adversarial examples. If however, different from
our results in section 5.2, no particular number of ad-
versarial examples is required, Multi-Scale C&W can be
used to find perturbations with the overall highest average
SNR; within our grid-search, the maximal average SNR for
C&W is 46.87dB (52 adversarial examples), while Multi-
Scale C&W reaches 64.26dB (3 adversarial examples).
Both targeted attacks can be used to transform any class
to a particular target prediction, as is demonstrated with
the example of the ‘Accordion’ class.
To put our results into perspective, we look at results
from the one already published comparable adversarial
attack in MIR [2]. The approach allows setting confi-
dence levels as well as minimal SNRs of adversarial ex-
amples. The authors achieve an average SNR of 23.0dB
and 15.78dB respectively for two datasets, with a confi-
dence level of 0.9. This setting allows them to reduce the
accuracy of genre recognition systems from 0.490 to 0.117
and from 0.632 to 0.413. When decreasing the confidence
level to 0.5 for the model with an initial accuracy of 0.632,
an average SNR of 11.15dB and a new accuracy of 0.28 is
obtained. In a different experiment, in which audio files are
transformed to all existing classes, confidence levels of 0.5
and 0.9 respectively lead to average SNRs of 34.5dB and
26.8dB. These results are comparable to ours, as higher
SNRs tend to lead to slightly lower average confidence
levels. For average confidences between 0.44 and 0.55,
we achieve average SNRs between 39.49dB and 44.23dB.
Also, we decrease our clean accuracy of 0.835 to accu-
racies never higher as 0.201. Therefore, while our end-
to-end methods do not support setting confidence level or
SNR beforehand, performing a search over different pa-
rameter settings allows us to find examples with slightly
higher average SNR and much more reduced accuracy.
The existence of adversarial examples suggests that
"being able to correctly label the test data does not imply
that our models truly understand the tasks we have asked
them to perform” [4] and that impressive results of perfor-
mance at almost human level might not use musical knowl-
edge at all [17, 26]. This directly brings us to the question
of validity, i.e. whether our instrument classification exper-
iment is actually measuring what we intended to measure
(see [27, 28]). Our real intention is to produce algorithms
classifying instrument sounds in general, not just for 799
instrument sounds in our data base, which of course ex-
tends the target population to all instrument sounds includ-
ing those with perturbations. If such small perturbations,
clearly not changing the perceived instrument characteris-
tics, have such a large impact on the classification system,
it must rely on a confounding factor exposing a problem
of internal validity, with no causal relation between type of
instrument represented in the audio and instrument label
returned by the classifier. It is also a problem of exter-
nal validity, with observed results not generalizing from
the original sound material to slightly changed versions
thereof. After we have successfully exposed these validity
and reliability problems in this paper, our future work will
aim at explaining what the confounding factors are and,
based on these insights, design a music instrument classi-
fication system that is robust against adversarial attacks.
7. CONCLUSION
In this work, we applied four different white-box adversar-
ial attacks to an instrument classification system. Going
beyond previous attacks, we computed adversarial exam-
ples directly for the waveform in an end-to-end fashion
instead of starting from the spectrogram. The four ad-
versaries were compared with respect to various factors
such as runtime complexity, number of adversarial exam-
ples that can be found and perceptibility of the adversarial
perturbations based on the SNR and listening examples.
The successful adversarial attacks were able to decisively
reduce accuracy of the classification system with adversar-
ial perturbations of waveforms being almost imperceptible.
This paper therefore is a contribution to the growing body
of work that questions the validity of MIR results by ex-
posing them to adversarial attacks, thereby gaining deeper
understanding of their mode of operation.
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